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Since its launch in 2007, Android has become the dominant mobile device
operating system worldwide. In light of this commercial success and certain
disputed business practices, Android has come under substantial attention
from competition authorities. We present key aspects of Google’s strategy in
mobile, focusing on Android-related practices that may have exclusionary
effects. We then assess Google’s practices under competition law and, where
appropriate, suggest remedies to right the violations we uncover.
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Since its launch in 2007, Android has become the dominant mobile device oper-
ating system (“OS”) worldwide. In 2015, there were more than 4.4 billion mobile
phone users and 1 billion tablet users in the world,1 over 80% of which run Google
Android.2 In light of this commercial success and certain disputed business prac-
tices, Android has come under substantial attention from competition authorities.
For instance, in September 2015, Russia’s Federal Antimonopoly Service com-
pleted an investigation finding that Google broke Russia’s competition rules by
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2‘Global mobile OS market share in sales to end users from 1st quarter 2009 to 1st quarter
2016,’ Statista, 2016.
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unfairly bundling its own services and preventing rival products from being
installed on Android software.3 Then, in April 2016, the European Commission
sent a statement of objections to Google indicating its preliminary view that
Google had committed an abuse of a dominant position by imposing certain
restrictions on Android device manufacturers and mobile network operators.4
The Korean Fair Trade Commission announced a similar investigation in
August 2016,5 and the US Federal Trade Commission was reported in September
2015 to have begun investigating Google’s tactics in mobile6 despite the Commis-
sion’s prior decision not to pursue Google’s disputed tactics in search and search
preferencing.7
A recurring theme in these investigations is the concern that Google’s
Android-related practices protect or enhance its position of strength in some key
applications or services, Google Search among others, to the detriment of compet-
ing app makers and service providers. We share this concern. As we show in this
paper, Google’s practices can produce exclusionary effects on competing app
makers and service providers. Of course, Google’s practices are unlikely to
harm the thousands of firms or individuals developing apps that do not compete
with Google’s. But these practices harm makers of apps that directly compete
with Google’s key apps, including in the sectors most important to advertisers
and most frequented by users. In particular, we show that Google’s restrictions
imposed on manufacturers of commercially viable Android users would increase
the difficulty of a new, innovative mobile search engine challenging Google
Search and competing on the merits.
Antitrust investigations are complex and fact-intensive, and thus the goal of
this paper is not to offer a full antitrust analysis of Google’s Android-related prac-
tices. Even if this were our aim, it would not be possible because most of the
licences and other documents implementing the restrictions at issue are not
3Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation, ‘FAS Russia Decision and
Determination of 18 September 2015’, No 1-14-21/00-11-15. The Russian authorities
also fined Google for its practices in mobile. See ‘Russian Antimonopoly Service Fines
Google $6.7 Mln’ Russian Legal Information Agency (11 August 2016) <http://www.
rapsinews.com/news/20160811/276651091.html>.
4European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google
on Android Operating System and Applications’ (20 April 2016, IP/16/1492) <http://www.
ipeuropa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1492_en.htm>.
5Song Jung-a, ‘South Korea Confirms Google Antitrust Probe’ The Financial Times (12
August 2016) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/59bd6b78-6044-11e6-b38c-7b39cbb1138a.
html#axzz4Hn7Tu74P>.
6Brent Kendall and Alistair Barr, ‘FTC Looking at Complaints over Google’s Android
Control’ The Wall Street Journal (25 September 2015) <http://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-
looking-at-complaints-over-googles-android-control-1443201867>.
7‘Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices’ The
Federal Trade Commission (3 January 2013) <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/295971/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf>.































public (although there are some notable exceptions which we examine in sub-
sequent sections). This difficulty is compounded by the fact that there is to date
only a single antitrust authority decision or court judgment assessing Google’s
restrictions under antitrust rules. (Indeed, even that decision, by Russia’s
Federal Antimonopoly Service, was until recently available only in Russian.
Only in the course of this article did we obtain, and post to the web, an English
translation.8) In light of these limitations, we use the available information to
provide a critical analysis of some of the restrictions that apply to device manufac-
turers that wish to develop commercially viable Android devices, and to assess the
arguments offered by Google (including some of the papers Google has commis-
sioned) to justify these restrictions.9
Undistorted competition in mobile environments carries special importance
given the growing reliance of individuals on mobile communications devices,
such as smartphones or tablets, as their primary means of access to the Internet.
The Microsoft antitrust investigations were set against a PC-centric era in which
most users relied on desktops and laptops,10 but today Android plays a corre-
spondingly central role for the majority of users.11 Without denying Android’s
merits, this paper concludes that Google’s Android-related contract provisions
harm competition to the detriment of developers of competing apps and services,
as well as to the detriment of consumers. The restrictions also hurt Android device
manufacturers by constraining their options, reducing their secondary revenue
sources and limiting their ability to distinguish themselves from competitors. To
protect competition on the merits and assure that consumers have access to the
best devices and services, we suggest that these practices should be eliminated
and their historic harm undone.
Against that background, this paper is divided into five sections. In Section I,
we present the relevant aspects of Google’s Android business and the key contract
provisions in dispute. In Section II, we explore the harms resulting from these pro-
visions. In Section III, we apply relevant legal principles, and in Section IV we
propose remedies responsive to the apparent violations and harms. Section V
offers a brief conclusion.
8Benjamin Edelman, ‘English Translation of FAS Russia Decision in Yandex v. Google’
<http://www.benedelman.org/news/092816-1.html>.
9Kent Walker, ‘Android’s Model of Open Innovation’ Google Europe Blog (20 April 2016)
<http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.com/2016/04/androids-model-of-open-innovation.
html>.
10‘Computer Ownership Up Sharply in the 1990s’, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics (March 1999) <http://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/archive/computer-
ownership-up-sharply-in-the-1990s.pdf>.
11See Preston Gralla, ‘The Era of the PC Is over – IDC’ Computerworld (2 December 2010)
<http://www.computerworld.com/article/2469794/mobile-apps/the-era-of-the-pc-is-
over——idc.html>.































I. Google’s Android business model and licensing requirements
A. Android’s business model, market positioning and apps
Google’s Android business is grounded in the company’s August 2005 acquisition
of Android, Inc., a small firm founded in 2003 to develop a mobile operating
system.12 In November 2007, approximately 10 months after the public launch
of Apple’s iPhone,13 Google unveiled what it called the Open Handset Alliance,
an “alliance of leading technology and wireless companies” collaborating to
develop “the first truly open and comprehensive platform for mobile devices.”14
As an operating system, Android necessarily sits between hardware, appli-
cations and users. It provides application developers with standard interfaces to
send and receive data as well as to present and receive information from users.
It also provides hardware manufacturers with an ecosystem of software appli-
cations, as well as user demand and marketing support.
Apple iOS, available on iPhones and iPad tablets, is Android’s main rival.15
However, Apple iOS is not a realistic alternative to Android for mobile device man-
ufacturers because iOS is not available to install on third-party hardware such as the
devices offered by HTC, Lenovo, LG, Samsung and others. Historically, hardware
makers could choose from among several other mobile operating systems, includ-
ing Windows Phone and Symbian. But as of 2016, neither option is commercially
viable. No Symbian handsets have shipped since 2013.16 Windows Phone is offi-
cially still available, but has found a harsh reception in the market, selling a total
of 101 million devices from 2011 through 2015 – compared to 4.5 billion iOS
and Android phones in the same period – leading Microsoft and Nokia to drop
Windows Phone offerings and reviewers to declare “Windows Phone is dead.”17
As a result, hardware manufacturers see little alternative to Android.
A portion of Android’s commercial success results from its price. From the
outset, Google offered Android to hardware manufacturers at no charge.18 In
12Lisa Eadicicco, ‘The Rise of Android: How a Flailing Startup Became the World’s
Biggest Computing Platform’ Business Insider (27 March 2015) <http://www.
businessinsider.com/how-android-was-created-2015-3>.
13Charles Arthur, ‘The History of Smartphones: Timeline’ The Guardian (24 January 2012)
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/jan/24/smartphones-timeline>.
14‘Industry Leaders Announce Open Platform for Mobile Devices’ Open Handset Alliance
(5 November 2007) <http://www.openhandsetalliance.com/press_110507.html>.
15Kate Bevan, ‘Android Wars Are Raging as Rivals Challenge Google’s Dominance’ The
Financial Times (19 October 2014) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/3ed11e7e-4d6b-11e4-
bf60-00144feab7de.html>.
16Christopher Null, ‘The End of Symbian: Nokia Ships Last Handset with the Mobile OS’
PC World (14 June 2013) <http://www.pcworld.com/article/2042071/the-end-of-symbian-
nokia-ships-last-handset-with-the-mobile-os.html>.
17Tom Warren, ‘Windows Phone Is Dead’ The Verge (28 January 2016) <http://www.
theverge.com/2016/1/28/10864034/windows-phone-is-dead>.
18Juan Carlos Perez, ‘Google Offers Up ‘Android’As Its New OpenMobile Platform’Mac-
world (5 November 2007), http://www.macworld.com/article/1060897/android.html.































contrast, Symbian and Windows Phone both initially charged licence fees, albeit
subsequently dropping those fees to zero in response to competition from
Android.19 In a paper commissioned by Google, Prof. Körber points out:
Google operates on two-sided markets on which the consumers decide about the
success of a service, but the remuneration comes from advertising clients. The distri-
bution of Android (and of most apps andmobile services) for a zero price is an indirect
tool to attract as much attention as possible by the consumers, increase mobile usage,
and ultimately monetise this usage, through advertising or otherwise.20
Application availability is a second reason for Android’s popularity. Mobile
devices can view web pages, but many services are better accessed through
apps which include executable code that runs on the local device – providing func-
tionality even when a device is unable to connect to a data network, and allowing
direct access to device hardware such as location sensors, accelerometer, camera
and microphone. These apps are written for specific platforms, and app makers
naturally focus on the most popular mobile platforms in order to reach as many
users as possible.
Google and others now offer a wide range of apps for a variety of purposes.
For example, for sending and receiving email, there is Google’s Gmail app, but
also all manner of others including from widely known firms (such as Microsoft
Outlook for Android and Yahoo Mail) as well as boutique specialists (Kale Inter-
active WeMail, Boxer and TypeApp’s TypeMail). For mapping and navigation,
Google Maps and Google Waze are widely used, but consumers can also
choose among MapQuest, Nokia HERE, Sygic, BackCountry Navigator and
dozens more. In many sectors, particularly those that are novel or small, consu-
mers choose only among independent apps, without any offerings from Google.
As we discuss below, most Android devices come bundled with an additional
software package known as Google Mobile Services (GMS). GMS includes
widely used Google apps including Google Maps, Gmail and YouTube, each of
which is available only through GMS and not for separate download by device
manufacturers, carriers or end users. GMS also includes Google Play, the app
store where users can download other apps from Google and third parties.
Some apps carry disproportionate importance to users, not just for their fre-
quency of use or value when used, but especially for the lack of substitutes.
19Andreas Constantinou, ‘Nokia and Symbian to Become One; Royalty-Free, Open Source
Roadmap’, Vision Mobile (24 June 2008) <http://www.visionmobile.com/blog/2008/06/
nokia-and-symbian-to-become-one-royalty-free-open-source-roadmap/>; Brad Chacos,
‘Microsoft Makes Windows Free on Phones, Small Tablets, and Gizmos – but Not PCs’,
PC World (2 April 2014) <http://www.pcworld.com/article/2139080/microsoft-makes-
windows-free-on-iot-and-small-mobile-devices-but-not-pcs.html>.
20Torsten Körber, Let’s Talk about Android – Observations on Competition in the Field of
Mobile Operating Systems (German Version: NZKart 4 July 2014), 378–6, <http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2462393>.































Google apps enjoy special power in this regard. ConsiderGoogle’sYouTube,which
is extremely popular and has no close competitors. For one, no other content library
offers YouTube’s distinctive format. With over 400 hours of video uploaded to
YouTube every minute, no other content library can match the breadth of content
available at YouTube.21 In principle, other apps can present content hosted by
YouTube, but Google retains preferred search, channel subscription, personalized
recommendations and easy sharing capabilities for its own app.22 In addition, a
native app provides integrated messaging,23 faster frame rates with higher image
quality,24 and, in a June 2016 addition, live video streaming.25
Users typically obtain apps from app “marketplaces” which organize available
software, track developer identity and reputation, and collate other users’ reviews
and assessments. While Android apps are available from a variety of marketplaces,
Google makes its apps available only from the company’s own marketplace,
Google Play. Furthermore, with 2.2 million apps, Google Play has several times
more apps than any competing Android app store.26 These advantages give
Google Play outsourced importance to users. As discussed below, Google
imposes certain contractual restrictions on device manufacturers wishing to prein-
stall Google Play and other Google apps.
B. Licensing and other contractual obligations for Android device
manufacturers
Depending on which type of “Android” devices they want to offer, device manu-
facturers have to sign one or several agreements.
1. Building a “bare” Android device
If a device manufacturer is prepared to offer a “bare” Android device, it need only
pass technical tests27 and accept the Android License Agreement. This approach
21‘Hours of Video Uploaded to YouTube Every Minute as of July 2015’, Statista, 2016.
22YouTube App, Google Play <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.google.
android.youtube&hl=en>.
23Davey Alba, ‘YouTube’s New Messenger Means You’ll Never Have to Leave YouTube’
Wired (11 May 2016) <http://www.wired.com/2016/05/youtubes-new-messenger-means-
youll-never-leave-youtube/>.
24Jim Lynch, ‘YouTube for Android Now Supports 60 FPS Video’ InfoWorld (1 July 2015)
<http://www.infoworld.com/article/2942751/android/youtube-for-android-now-supports-
60-fps-video.html>.
25Davey Alba, ‘Youtube’s New Messenger Means You’ll Never Have to Leave Youtube’
Wired (11 May 2016) <http://www.wired.com/2016/05/youtubes-new-messenger-means-
youll-never-leave-youtube/>.
26‘Number of Apps Available in Leading App Stores as of June 2016’ Statista, 2016.
27‘Compatibility Test Suite’, Android (2016) <http://source.android.com/compatibility/cts/
index.html>.































reduces the contractual restrictions the manufacturer must accept, potentially
increasing flexibility to configure a device as the manufacturer sees fit.
However, this approach foregoes several key benefits that most device manufac-
turers seek.
Notably, bare Android devices are not permitted to include any Google apps
(the distribution of which is conditioned on other contracts discussed below).
For some Google apps, the device manufacturer may substitute an alternative –
perhaps Yahoo Maps instead of Google Maps. But for other Google apps, the
alternative is less clear. Notably, as discussed above, there is no apparent substitute
for YouTube. Most troublesome is the prohibition that bare Android devices
include Google Play, the app store whereby users obtain other apps, both from
Google and from independent app developers. Without Google Play, users
cannot easily obtain the Google apps they typically expect.
As a result, bare Android is not what consumers expect when they purchase
modern mobile devices.
2. Building a “normal” Android device
To obtain GMS and distribute an Android device that consumers view as
“normal,” a manufacturer must sign two additional agreements.
First, the device manufacturer must sign a Mobile Application Distribution
Agreement (MADA). It seems the MADA is customized for each manufacturer,
and by all indications Google intended MADAs to be confidential. Nonetheless,
the main MADA requirements can be found in the two MADAs which became
publicly available during the course of copyright litigation between Google and
Oracle.28 First, manufacturers must “preinstall” “all Google applications” that
Google specifies.29 Second, Google requires that these preinstalled apps be promi-
nent, with certain apps presented “at least on the panel immediately adjacent to the
Default Home Screen” and others “no more than one level below the Phone
Top.”30 Newer MADAs even specify the sequence, from left to right and top to
bottom, in which the Google apps must be presented.31 Third, Google requires
that Google Search “must be set as the default search provider for all Web
28Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (Android) Between Google Inc. and HTC
Corporation. § 2.1. (1 January 2011) [hereinafter Google-HTC MADA]; exhibit 286 in
Oracle America Inc. v. Google, 872 F.Supp.2d 974 (N.D. Cal., 2012). Mobile Application
Distribution Agreement (Android) Between Google Inc. and Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd
(1 January 2011) [hereinafter Google-Samsung MADA], exhibit 2775 in Oracle v. Google.
29MADA section 2.1.
30MADA section 3.4.(2)–(3).
31Amir Efrati, ‘Google’s Confidential Android Contracts Show Rising Requirements’ The
Information (26 September 2014) <https://www.theinformation.com/Google-s-
Confidential-Android-Contracts-Show-Rising-Requirements>.































search access points,” ruling out the possibility of any other search provider being
the default.32 Subsequent revisions require that Google Search be the default for
“assist” and “voice search” functions, and in addition require that Google
Search be activated when a user presses and holds a device’s physical “Home”
button or “swipes up” from a digital home button.33 Fourth, Google requires
that Google’s Network Location Provider service be preloaded and the default,
tracking users’ geographic location at all times and sending that location infor-
mation to Google.34 Finally, Google requires that any time a mobile app presents
a web page, the web page must be rendered by a “Google WebView Component”
(the core of a web browser).35
To make a “normal” Android device, a device manufacturer also needs to
sign the Anti-Fragmentation Agreement (“AFA”). The provisions of the AFA
are confidential, and as far as we know, no copy has ever been released to the
public – not from Google, through litigation, by accident or in any other way.
Nonetheless, Google confirms the existence of the AFA, explaining that “we
ask manufacturers who are preloading our apps to put their device through a
compatibility test and sign our Anti-Fragmentation Agreement.”36 By all indi-
cations, Google’s stated concern is modified Android code, a so-called fork,
which could cause some devices to be unable to run apps that work on other
devices, or otherwise to be incompatible. Notably, it seems that the AFA is a
company-wide document, binding a manufacturer for all of its present and
even future devices.37 Thus, AFA obligations apply to the entire operations of
the companies that sign.
3. Learnings from device manufacturers’ experience marketing bare Android
When challenged about MADA and AFA restrictions, Google typically points out
that device manufacturers are not required to accept these agreements to manufac-
ture Android devices. For example, Google’s General Counsel in April 2016
argued that Google’s “partner agreements are entirely voluntary – anyone can
use Android without Google.”38 Indeed, Google made such claims as early as





36‘Frequently Asked Questions’, Google (2016) <https://landing.google.com/intl/en/
androidisforusers/faq.html>.
37See Commission press release (n 4) (“However, if a manufacturer wishes to pre-install
Google proprietary apps, including Google Play Store and Google Search, on any of its
devices, Google requires it to enter into an ‘Anti-Fragmentation Agreement’ that
commits it not to sell devices running on Android forks” (emphasis added)).
38Walker (n 9).































“Google will include its apps suite with the platform, but since the platform is
open, a manufacturer or operator can remove some or all the applications.”39
While these claims are strictly true, they do not capture the commercial
reality of customer requirements or the reality of the choice available to a
device manufacturer. If a manufacturer offers bare Android, it need not
preload any specific Google app, but in that case the device cannot include
any Google app including those that are expected by the vast majority of users
and are necessary for commercial success. To get even a single Google app,
including the Play Store that provides access to others’ apps, the device manu-
facturer must sign the MADA and the AFA, committing to preload a full suite
of Google apps, accepting Google’s other requirements and promising not to
use modified versions of Android on any devices they sell. This is far from
the flexibility Google suggests.
Nonetheless, some device manufacturers have pursued this approach. Their
experiences illustrate the challenges of offering bare Android to mainstream con-
sumers in western markets. A notable example is Amazon, which in July 2014,
began to distribute Fire Phones which did not preload any Google apps and
indeed were not marketed with the Android name or logo. Reviews prominently
complained about the lack of Google apps. The Wall Street Journal’s review
flagged the problem: “Don’t expect to get all the apps you love: Though it
runs on a version of Google’s Android operating system, Google apps like
Maps, Drive and YouTube are locked out.”40 Furthermore, if a consumer had
already purchased a paid app via Google Play for a prior Android device, a
non-Google Play device would be unable to recognize the prior purchase or
install the app – requiring the customer to repurchase every such app.41 With
these limitations, the Fire Phone was not commercially viable, and Amazon dis-
continued it just one year after launch, taking a $170 million write-down on the
project.42
Similarly, beginning in February 2014, Nokia offered the Nokia X, running
bare Android customized with Nokia’s services, notably without Google apps.43
This approach also attracted little consumer excitement. A mobile device
39Greg Sterling, ‘Google’s Android Arrives: Not Gphone but an Open Source Mobile
Phone Platform’ Search Engine Land (5 November 2007) <http://searchengineland.com/
googles-android-arrives-not-gphone-but-an-open-source-mobile-phone-platform-12611>.
40Geoffrey A Fowler, ‘Amazon Fire Phone Review: Full of Gimmicks, Lacking Basics’ The
Wall Street Journal (23 July 2014) <http://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-fire-phone-
review-full-of-gimmicks-lacking-basics-1406077565>.
41ibid.
42Kia Kokalitcheva, ‘Amazon Is Killing Off the Fire Phone’ Fortune (9 September 2015)
<http://fortune.com/2015/09/09/amazon-killing-fire-phone/>.
43TomWarren, ‘This Is Nokia X: Android and Windows Phone Collide’ The Verge (24 Feb-
ruary 2014) <http://www.theverge.com/2014/2/24/5440498/nokia-x-android-phone-hands-
on>.































analyst remarked that the phone “falls short” of consumers’ expectations.44 Blog-
gers noted specific problems including lacking Google apps, lacking Google Play
access to obtain other apps, and specific apps (WhatsApp among others) unavail-
able even through Nokia’s app store.45 Meanwhile, in April 2014, Microsoft
announced its purchase of Nokia, creating a strategic conflict since the primary
rationale for the transaction was to advance Microsoft’s Windows Phone operating
system. Facing a poor market reception as well as internal conflict, Nokia X was
discontinued in July 2014.46
Much of the weakness of non-GMS devices comes from the lack of Google
Play and resulting unavailability of Google apps and difficulty obtaining third-
party apps. In principle, end users can “sideload” desired apps directly onto an
Amazon Fire Phone or other non-GMS phone. Indeed, the web site sideloadfire-
phone.com is devoted entirely to this possibility. But enabling sideloading requires
first reducing phone security settings, which users will rightly hesitate to do. More-
over, rather than accessing a convenient app store via an app preinstalled on the
phone, users must navigate sites like sideloadfirephone.com and rawapk.com,
which are notably less intuitive. Sideloading users also forego other app store fea-
tures such as reviews, one-tap app activation, uninstall and more. A user might
sideload the Google Play app store onto an Amazon Fire Phone. But the
process of sideloading Google Play is particularly convoluted, requiring 11 separ-
ate steps including four downloads from a file-hosting site with no obvious indicia
of trustworthiness.47 Users have every reason to distrust this process and refuse to
attempt it.
Relatedly, even if a user manages to sideload a competing app store, that app
store would remain unsatisfactory to most users. Google withholds its own apps
from competing app stores, immediately putting competing app stores at a
major disadvantage.48 Furthermore, Google Play has several times more apps
than any other Android app store,49 and popular independent apps are systemati-
cally missing from third-party app stores.50
One might draw a somewhat more favourable view of the marketability of bare
Android devices based on, at the least, the survival of Amazon’s Kindle Fire tablet.
44‘Discontinued Nokia X Phones Suffered from a Lack of Identity’ Gadgets 360 (18 July
2014) <http://gadgets.ndtv.com/mobiles/features/discontinued-nokia-x-phones-suffered-
from-a-lack-of-identity-561119>.
45Narender Singh, ‘Do Not Buy Nokia X Devices (Including X2) – My Reasons’ Tech-
Mesto (17 July 2014) <https://www.techmesto.com/avoid-nokia-x-xl/>.
46Gadgets 360 (n 44).
47‘Google Play for the Amazon Fire Phone’ Sideload Fire Phone (2016) <http://
sideloadfirephone.com/google-play-for-the-amazon-fire-phone/>.
48‘Why Android Users Should Have Google Play Store App on Their Device’ Neurogadget
(17 May 2016) <http://neurogadget.net/2016/05/17/android-users-google-play-store-app-
device/30446>.
49Statista (n 21).
50See eg Gadgets 360 (n 44), as to WhatsApp missing from the Nokia X app store.































First released in November 2011, the Kindle Fire tablet has been repeatedly
updated and seems to have found a pool of satisfied customers, focusing on
media content that Amazon licences and distributes. Yet as a non-MADA-compli-
ant device, a Kindle Fire tablet also lacks GMS and thus cannot preinstall any
Google apps – an omission that users widely complain about.51 Here too, third-
party web sites provide sideloading instructions, but the process is unattractive
in the many steps required, not to mention deceptive advertising which diverts
users to unrelated apps.52 Sideloading Google Play remains the most difficult,
requiring a USB connection to a Windows computer, adjusting Kindle Fire secur-
ity settings, ignoring Windows security warnings, installing special drivers on the
computer and running a script on the computer to modify the Fire tablet to run
Google Play – a process that one web site explains in four sections with 23 para-
graphs of instructions (plus eight bulleted substeps) and 12 screenshots.53 Even if
technical experts find the process workable, it is far from accessible to ordinary
users.
Experience in certain developing countries offers a somewhat different sense
of the importance of GMS and hence the need for device manufacturers to accept
Google’s MADA and AFA restrictions. Most notable is China, where Android
enjoys nearly 74% market share,54 yet GMS-equipped phones are virtually
absent.55 The absence of GMS is explained in part by a full ecosystem of compet-
ing apps (including competing app stores from well-established Chinese firms56)
which make it feasible for manufacturers to forego GMS. Furthermore, at various
points the Chinese government has blocked most Google servers from sending
data in an out of China,57 making it particularly easy for competitors to develop
apps and services that consumers find more reliable and ultimately more attractive
than Google’s offerings. That said, these factors are unlikely to recur elsewhere.
51‘Can’t Use Voice Search on Kindle Fire’ Amazon Developer Forums (21 September
2014) <https://forums.developer.amazon.com/questions/14243/cant-use-voice-search-on-
kindle-fire.html>.
52Locust, ‘How to Install Google Play Store App on Kindle Fire Without Rooting’ thefire-
tablet.com <http://thefiretablet.com/posts/install-free-google-play-store-app-on-kindle-fire-
without-rooting/>.
53Chris Hoffman, ‘How to Install the Google Play Store on Your Amazon Fire Tablet’How-
To Geek (6 November 2015) <http://www.howtogeek.com/232726/how-to-install-the-
google-play-store-on-your-amazon-fire-tablet/>.
54‘Market Share Held by Smartphone Operating Systems in China from 2013 to 2016, by
Month’ Statista, 2016.
55Meg Butler, ‘Why No One in China Has an Android Phone’ GSM Nation (23 November
2012) <http://www.gsmnation.com/blog/2012/11/23/why-no-one-in-china-has-an-android-
phone/>.
56Viranch, ‘Google and China: 5 Reasons Why It’s Tough to Bring Back the Play Store’
TechPP (28 November 2015) <http://techpp.com/2015/11/28/google-china-play-store/>.
57Keith Bradsher and Paul Mozur, ‘China Clamps Down onWeb, Pinching Companies Like
Google’ The New York Times (21 September 2014).































For example, most countries are unlikely to block Google services, and most com-
panies lack strong local incumbents to provide key services.
Beginning in 2014, mobile software firm Cyanogen touted its “Google-free”
version of Android, substituting third-party services for each component of
GMS.58 But Cyanogen’s approach was, by all accounts, slow to catch on –
leading to 2016 layoffs and widespread discussion of shifts in the company’s strat-
egy.59 On the whole, Cyanogen’s suite of competing apps could not match
Google’s functionality. Moreover, Cyanogen’s strategy remained importantly
limited by Google’s various restrictions, including preventing Cyanogen and man-
ufacturers from selecting desired Google apps (due to MADA restrictions) and
preventing manufacturers from shipping some Cyanogen devices and some
GMS devices (per the AFA discussed below).
In his Google-commissioned article, Prof. Körber suggests that bare
Android is a viable option for device manufacturers, arguing that “some
OEMs and MNOs actually exclude GMS and Google services from their
Android devices, and nevertheless are successfully [sic] on the markets.”60
But in fact the few manufacturers that tried to avoid MADA requirements
are notable primarily for their failures, as discussed above. Körber cites
Amazon Fire, Nokia X and CyanogenMod as examples of non-GMS devices.
But to the extent that he presents these as successful or commercially viable,
time has proven his claims mistaken; his article was published in July 2014,
on the eve of discontinuation of Nokia X and just before withdrawal of the
Fire Phone. Nor do Cyanogen’s struggles and sluggish market acceptance
advance Körber’s argument.
As a result, device manufacturers seeking to offer commercially viable
Android devices have no choice but to sign the MADA and AFA contracts and
accept the significant restrictions they contain.
II. Harmful effects of the requirements imposed on Android
manufacturers
We now turn to the effects of Google’s restrictions on Android, including the
MADA and AFA contracts. While the specific effects vary, the restrictions all con-
tribute to protecting Google’s dominance in search, as well as in other key apps
and services for which alternatives are available.
58R Maxwell, ‘Cyanogen Wants to Take the ‘Google’ out of Android’ Phone Arena (25
January 2016) <http://www.phonearena.com/news/Cyanogen-wants-to-take-the-Google-
out-of-Android_id65194>.
59Leo Sun, ‘Wannabe Google Assassin Cyanogen Runs Out of Bullets’ The Motley Fool
(28 July 2016) <http://www.fool.com/investing/2016/07/28/googles-wannabe-assassin-
cyanogen-runs-out-of-bull.aspx>.
60Körber (n 20).































A. Requiring mobile device manufacturers to include certain Google apps
and defaults in order to get any part of Google mobile services
The MADA contracts implement Google’s strategy of making GMS an all-or-
nothing choice for device manufacturers, increasing the likelihood of manufac-
turers choosing Google’s app suite and correspondingly increasing the barriers
against competition from makers of rival apps.
1. Foreclosing entry by competing apps and services
Google’s MADA strategy is grounded in Google’s market power in areas without
close substitutes (including Google Play and YouTube). With that power, Google
compels distribution of its other apps and services (such as Google Search and
Maps), even if competitors have viable offerings. In particular, Google uses its
market power in the first group to protect and expand in the second – enlarging
its dominance and deterring entry.
Tying apps together helps Google whenever a device manufacturer sees no
substitute to even one of Google’s apps. Some manufacturers may be willing to
offer devices that default to Bing Search, DuckDuckGo, MapQuest or Yahoo
Maps, particularly if paid a fee to do so. The manufacturer could retain the
payment as profit, or pass the savings to consumers via a lower retail price. But
only Play lets a manufacturer offer comprehensive access to substantially all
apps. Furthermore, a manufacturer would struggle without YouTube preinstalled;
such a device would be unattractive to many consumers, and in many markets,
mobile carriers would struggle to sell costly data plans for devices without
YouTube access. Needing Google Play and YouTube, a manufacturer must then
accept Google Search, Maps, Network Location Provider and more – even if
the manufacturer prefers a competitor’s offering or would prefer payment for
installing some alternative.
Google’s ties thus harm competition. For one, the restrictions prohibit alterna-
tive vendors from outcompeting Google’s apps on the merits. No matter their
advantages, device manufacturers must install Google’s full suite as instructed
by the MADA. Furthermore, Google can amend its rules to make its new apps
the default in the corresponding categories, and updated MADAs reveal that
Google has indeed made such revisions.61
Moreover, Google’s ties impede competitors’ efforts to pay device manufac-
turers for distribution. Where Google permits installation of additional apps, a
manufacturer cannot provide a competing app maker with default or exclusive pla-
cement (precisely the options ruled out by Google’s requirement of preinstalling
its app). Rather, the manufacturer can offer only inferior duplicative placement.
Consider, say, Yahoo Maps – a competitor to Google Maps. Yahoo Maps
61Efrati (n 31).































managers likely seek increased usage of their service, and if the Yahoo Maps app
were the only mapping app preinstalled on a new smartphone, Yahoo’s projections
would probably indicate substantial usage – enough to justify a large up-front
payment to the phone manufacturer. But with Google Maps guaranteed to
remain installed and prominent, because the MADA so requires, Yahoo’s projec-
tions will anticipate much lower usage, hence less worth paying for. At best,
Yahoo will be willing to make some reduced payment to a device manufacturer.
Equally likely is that the reduction in value may make the deal pointless, too
small to be worth pursuing, as competing app makers are forced to resort to
other promotional methods or, for some apps, accept the reality that there is no
cost-effective way to reach the required users.
2. Additional harms when Google requires default settings
Many of Google’s MADA requirements insist not just that mobile device manu-
facturers preinstall Google apps, but that they preset Google apps and services
as the default from each search access point. These defaults entail an important
element of exclusivity. Each search access point can only have one default
search provider. Furthermore, each device can have only one default assist for
voice search; a device can trigger only one function based on a prolonged
button push; a device can have only one default Network Location Provider and
only one component that renders web pages inside of apps. Google’s MADA pro-
visions insist that Google receives each of these benefits.
In principle, Google’s compulsory defaults leave manufacturers free to install
other apps and services as non-defaults. But experience shows that few users
change their defaults or otherwise stray from the default system settings.62 Defer-
ence to the default is particularly likely for services with no user-facing user inter-
face (such as location tracking) or with no visible user interface (such as voice
search). If competing app and service makers perceive low usage response to
non-default placement, they will be correspondingly unwilling to pay for such pla-
cement, as detailed in the prior section. In any event, such placement will be cor-
respondingly limited in its ability to advance competition.
Körber’s Google-commissioned paper also argues that the MADA require-
ment that Google Search be the default “is of a very limited practical relevance”
because, he says, the requirement only applies to a “specific intent” by which
one Android app can invoke another.63 But the plain language of the MADA
imposes a notably broader requirement, insisting that device manufacturers
62See eg Jared Spool, ‘Do Users Change Their Settings?’ User Interface Engineering (14
September 2011) <https://www.uie.com/brainsparks/2011/09/14/do-users-change-their-
settings/>. See also Jakob Nielsen, ‘The Power of Defaults’ Nielsen Norman Group (26
September 2005) <https://www.nngroup.com/articles/the-power-of-defaults/>.
63Körber (n 20), at 9.































must set “Google Search… as the default search provider for all Web search
access points.”64 The plain language of the MADA thus encompasses default
search from the text entry box on an Android device’s home screen – a valuable
and prominent search interface of great importance in directing users’ searches.
Moreover, more recent MADAs include a specific requirement that Google
Search be a user’s default voice search65 – here too, widely and frequently used.
3. Assessing Google’s justifications
In response to the European Commission’s announcement that it had adopted a
statement of objections against Google’s contractual restrictions in mobile soft-
ware licensing, Google’s General Counsel66 offered several arguments to justify
the company’s approach.
First, Google noted that Android is “open source” and that device manufac-
turers “can download the entire operating system for free, modify it how [they]
want, and build a phone.”67 Indeed, as Google points out, device manufacturers
need not sign the MADA if they do not want to be bound by the restrictions it con-
tains. Nonetheless, this carries a high price to manufacturers, as their devices
would then be deprived of Google Play, YouTube and other Google apps that
the majority of users expect to have preloaded on their devices. Without these
apps and features, most consumers will find a device unattractive, as Nokia,
Amazon and others have learned, as discussed in Section I.B.3. Google offers
manufacturers no real option when asking them to choose between Google’s
restrictions versus commercial irrelevance.
Second, Google observes that manufacturers can “choose to load the suite of
Google apps to their device and freely add other apps as well.”68 But this is little
solace to manufacturers who, having promised to preinstall Google apps, cannot
offer a competitor exclusivity or the most prominent placement, as discussed in
Section II.A.1. Furthermore, certain Google requirements demand exclusivity,
either explicitly or through technical architecture, including for default search pro-
vider, location provider and voice search provider, as discussed in Section II.A.2.
For these services and functions, Google errs in claiming manufacturers can install
other options in parallel.
Third, Google denies that consumers are harmed because they can “personal-
ize their devices and download apps on their own – including apps that directly






































Google. For one, only savvy users make major customizations.70 Furthermore,
user customizations give competing app developers no way to pay to attract
users en masse, as they could by, for example, contracting with device manufac-
turers or carriers. Nor do user customizations let app developers partially subsidize
devices.
Fourth, Google notes that “while Android is free for manufacturers to use, it’s
costly to develop, improve, keep secure, and defend against patent suits.”71
Google says the company had therefore to offset those costs via “revenue
[from] Google apps and services [it] distribute[s] via Android.”72 Surely Google
should be allowed to operate a two-sided business model, including using
revenue from one portion of the business to cover costs elsewhere. But
Google’s choice of a two-sided business model cannot be carte blanche to elim-
inate competition. Following Google’s logic, every two-sided business would be
free to restrict competition on the free side of its business on the basis of the unsub-
stantiated claim that such restrictions stimulate demand for its fee-paying activi-
ties. Moreover, following Google’s logic, competition authorities would be
prohibited from limiting or disallowing such restrictions. This mischaracterizes
the state of competition law. While there is nothing inherently wrong in distribut-
ing Android for free, Google’s choice to do so cannot legitimize the company’s
exclusionary tactics.
In addition, authors of papers commissioned by Google developed additional
arguments to justify the MADA restrictions. First, Körber argues that
the MADA must be seen in the context of competition among “mobile device eco-
systems” (Android, iOS, Windows Phone, Blackberry and others). Most OEMs
install the suite of apps on their devices as consumers expect smartphones to
come with functionalities and apps “out of the box”.… The MADA ensures that
users – who choose to buy a device with GMS – get a device with a full set of
apps that offer a “Google experience” similar to the “Apple experience” offered
by iOS devices or the “Microsoft experience” offered by Windows Phone devices.73
Whatever the benefits of the “experience” Körber emphasizes, we question
whether that benefit outweighs the effects on competition. Notably, Körber’s
70See eg Derek Walter, ‘How to Change the Default Search Engine in Android’ Green Bot
(5 February 2015) <http://www.greenbot.com/article/2879150/how-to-change-the-default-




73Körber (n 20). See also J Gregory Sidak,Do Free Mobile Apps Harm Consumers? 52 San
Diego Law Review 619, 674 (2015). (“The MADA’s conditions on distribution of GMS
enable android-operated devices to meet consumer expectations. The vast majority of
mobile devices reached the end user with a set of pre-installed apps that offer consistent
out-of-the-box experience that consumers demand.”)































reasoning ignores the foreclosure of competing best-of-breed apps that cannot gain
traction in a world of “experience” ecosystems. Nor is it realistic to ask an upstart
app maker to make a full “experience” of its own, as a full ecosystem is of course
much more burdensome than a single great app. That Apple provides such an
“experience” is beside the point from a competition perspective; as the dominant
platform, Android is rightly subject to greater restrictions.
Second, Sidak argues that the MADA “enables Google to prevent free riding
by its competitors.”74 In support of this argument, Sidak presents the case of
Google Play. But manufacturers’ distribution of Google Play, onto additional
devices even without other Google apps and services, would be the very opposite
of the “free-riding” Sidak claims. When a user buys an app through Google Play,
Google retains a commission of 30%, passing the remaining 70% through to the
app maker.75 If Google deems this 30% fee insufficient in light of the costs of
making and operating Google Play, Google could raise the fee as it sees fit. Nor
would other Google apps support Sidak’s argument. For example, the YouTube
app shows commercials, and industry analysts estimate that YouTube now at
least covers its costs based on this ad revenue.76 Far from “free-riding” on
Google investments, manufacturers who distribute the YouTube app would
be giving Google no-charge additional distribution of a revenue-generating
service.
B. Preventing manufacturers from selling devices running on competing
operating systems based on Android
To distribute GMS and the must-have Google apps, Google also requires device
manufacturers to accept the AFA. As discussed in Section I.B.2, the effects of
this requirement are particularly difficult to assess because, to our knowledge,
the AFA has never been released to the public.
Papers commissioned by Google style the AFA as a benefit to consumers,
reducing the problem of modified OS code yielding incompatibilities. For
example, Sidak argues that “[f]ragmentation might cause the malfunctioning of
mobile apps and thus degrade the quality of the consumer experience.” He
notes corresponding problems for app developers: “Fragmentation would also
harm the development of apps for Android-operated devices. As fragmentation
worsens, the cost of developing and maintaining apps for divergent versions of
Android rises.”77
74Sidak (n 73), at 675.
75‘Transaction Fees’, Google Developer Console Help <https://support.google.com/
googleplay/android-developer/answer/112622?hl=en>.
76Rolfe Winkler, ‘YouTube: 1 Billion Viewers, No Profit’Wall Street Journal (25 February
2015) <http://www.wsj.com/articles/viewers-dont-add-up-to-profit-for-youtube-
1424897967>.
77Sidak (n 73), at 671.































We acknowledge the problem of fragmentation and the potential benefit of pol-
icies that reduce fragmentation. But the Commission’s Statement of Objections
and other publicly available information indicate that Google’s AFA restrictions
go considerably further. In particular, the AFA commits a device manufacturer
to not distribute a modified version of Android on any of its devices.78 Notably,
the AFA appears to apply to all of a manufacturer’s devices, not just a single
device for which the manufacturer seeks benefits that Google conditions on the
AFA. In particular, a carrier cannot accept the AFA as to some of its devices,
but retain the right to distribute other devices that violate AFA.
Amazon’s experience is illustrative. Amazon’s Fire Phone and Fire Tablet both
use alternative versions of Android, modified from Google’s standard version. It
seems Amazon was permitted to design and sell devices with this modified
code precisely because Amazon is not a manufacturer of GMS-equipped phones
that bind all of Amazon to the AFA. In contrast, if competing phone manufacturer
Samsung were to attempt to sell the Fire (or any other device that, like Fire, was
grounded in a modification of Android), that would breach the AFA and expose
Samsung to cancellation of its licence to distribute GMS, which Samsung of
course relies on for its scores of other devices. The experience of phone manufac-
turer Acer offers a useful example. When Acer in 2012 planned to sell phones
running a modified version of Android, the company reported that Google
required it not to do so and threatened to withhold access to other Google soft-
ware.79 The AFA thus makes it commercially infeasible for established device
manufacturers, including Samsung and others, from attempting the architectural
innovation Amazon explored in Fire. It is little stretch to think such innovation
would be more successful by Samsung than by Amazon – Samsung’s experience
as the largest manufacturer of phones would likely help.80 But the AFA denies
Samsung this strategy and denies consumers the benefit of devices that combine
Amazon’s creative approach with Samsung’s experience.
On this understanding, the AFA substantially raises the stakes for any company
considering distributing amodified version ofAndroid. By requiring that amanufac-
turer give up all licences toGMSwhen it distributes a customized version ofAndroid
contrary to the AFA, Google requires any manufacturer to “bet the company” on its
78‘Statement by Commissioner Vestager on Sending a Statement of Objections to Google
on Android Operating System and Applications’ European Commission Press Release
Database (20 April 2016) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-1506_
en.htm>, “Google prevents manufacturers who wish to pre-install Google apps on even
one of their devices from using modified, competing versions of Android on any of their
other devices” (emphasis added).
79Michael Kan, ‘Google Threat Blamed as Acer Cancels China Smartphone Launch’ Com-
puterworld (13 September 2012) <http://www.computerworld.com/article/2492455/data-
center/google-threat-blamed-as-acer-cancels-china-smartphone-launch.html>.
80‘Smartphone Vendor Market Share, 2015, Q2’ IDC <http://www.idc.com/prodserv/
smartphone-market-share.jsp>.































experiment with a non-GMS version of Android. Established device manufacturers
– those best positioned to offer high-quality devices that consumers want – cannot
justify foregoing their existing business for the small chance at something new.
C. Exclusionary payments to device makers
In a press release on 20 April 2016, the European Commission noted that in
addition to the above restrictions, Google may have breached EU competition
law by “giving financial incentives to manufacturers and mobile network operators
on condition that they exclusively preinstall Google Search on their devices.”81
According to Commissioner Vestager, the Commission found evidence that as a
result of such payments, “device manufacturers and mobile network operators
have refrained from preinstalling alternative search services.”82 Industry sources
confirm these allegations, describing Revenue Sharing Agreements (RSAs) that
provide a device manufacturer with a share of Google’s advertising revenue
from searches on that device only if the device manufacturer commits not to
install competing search services. We are informed that some RSAs disallow
any competing search services, while others name specific competitors whose
apps and search providers must not be installed.83
Google has neither acknowledged such payments nor tried to justify them. In our
view,Google’s rationale for suchpayments is probably thatwhile theMADArequires
that Google be the “default” search provider, it leaves open the possibility of a man-
ufacturer preinstalling other search apps – perhaps a Bing or Yahoo icon leading to a
search box.We question howmany users would use such an app if it were installed in
thisway, both because itwould not be the default and because it seems thatmost users
broadly tend to favour Google search. Nonetheless, Google’s payments to manufac-
turers rule out this possibility – thereby excluding the opportunity for rival search
engines to get even the benefit of parallel, limited access to users.
Google’s payments also risk creating an all-or-nothing decision for countries
or regions where a device is to be offered, further impeding entry by prospective
competitors. In many sectors, an entrant would most readily offer a new service
only in a particular national or regional market – for example, a search engine
that searches only pages in a given language, or a service that reviews local
businesses only in a given geographic scope. Such an entrant would naturally
seek distribution only within the corresponding region, and could offer viable pay-
ments for distribution only within that area. Consider the interaction of this strat-
egy with Google’s payments for search defaults. If Google’s payments are
81‘Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google on Android Operating
System and Applications’ European Commission Press Release Database (20 April 2016)
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1492_en.htm>.
82Vestager (n 78).
83Our industry source prefers not to be listed by name or affiliation due to the sensitivity of
these allegations.































contingent on worldwide exclusive preinstallation of Google Search, consistent
with the worldwide scope of the MADA and AFA, an entrant could not offer a
payment only for distribution in the specific country or region where it focuses
operation; the entrant would have to bid against Google on a worldwide basis
where Google predictably wins.
D. Dispute resolution and penalties further compel device manufacturer
compliance
After carefully reviewing all applicable contracts, some device manufacturers
might look for opportunities to install third-party apps or otherwise customize
devices, both to provide distinctive devices and to obtain additional revenue.
But Google’s contractual framework and approach to dispute resolution might
cause device manufacturers to fear taking actions that Google views unfavourably.
For one, Google’s MADA specifically requires that a device manufacturer obtain
Google’s approval for each new device.84 Nothing in the MADA compels Google
to provide its approval in any particular circumstances or with any particular
speed, and indeed the MADA leaves open the possibility that Google might with-
hold approval for unrelated matters. While the relevant portions of other contracts
are not publicly available, by all indications Google similarly retains significant
discretion in each. Device manufacturers thus anticipate that if they implement
strategies that Google dislikes, they may face retaliation up to and including pro-
hibitions that they distribute Google apps. Indeed, when Google sought to block
distribution of certain software from competing geolocation service Skyhook,
Google told Samsung that its devices “cannot be shipped” with the disfavoured
Skyhook code.85 Anticipating similar threats from Google, other device manufac-
turers correctly perceive that they must not take actions adverse to Google.
Notably, Google’s agreements with device manufacturers allow Google to
impose penalties, including stop-ship orders, on a unilateral basis. In the
Samsung incident described, Google did not need to seek ratification from a
court or even an arbitrator or other independent authority. Rather, Google
imposed the stop-ship order on its own and with immediate effect.
E. Preventing entry by a more efficient competitor
Taken together, Google’s contractual restrictions could impede entry even by a
competitor that is better than Google and, in the relevant sense, more efficient
84MADA section 4.3.
85Email from Andy Rubin to WP Hong, 22 June 2010, ‘RE: [Urgent] GPS-Related Issue on
Galaxy S’. Affidavit of Douglas RTillberg for Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (Exhibit 16), Skyhook Wireless, Inc. v. Google Inc.,
86 Mass. App. Ct. 611 (2014).































than Google. Consider some company NewCo that produces a mobile search
engine of notably high quality, such that once users try NewCo’s service, they
prefer it to Google Search. How would NewCo make its offering known to
consumers?
NewCo could pay device manufacturers to preinstall its search engine on their
devices. But that technique would be ineffective because Google’s MADA
requirements would assure both that Google would remain preinstalled and
indeed also the default. NewCo’s payments would yield only parallel, additional
placement of much-reduced value. Furthermore, even if NewCo were willing to
pay device manufacturers to preinstall its offering, its efforts could be thwarted
by Google’s incentive payments to device manufacturers for exclusive preloading
of Google Search. While NewCo could attempt to outbid Google, that would be an
expensive effort for the modest benefit of a parallel and additional placement.
If NewCo found it intractable to gain access to consumers on mainstream
Android devices, the company could instead try to reach users via an alternative
Android platform to be developed by an interested manufacturer. But here too,
Google restrictions stand in the way. Any established manufacturer would be
unable to take such a risk on NewCo, as it would be commercial suicide to
breach the AFA and lose the ability to preload GMS on any of its devices.
Nor is it any serious answer to suggest that NewCo do business with Apple.
Google reportedly pays Apple more than $1 billion to be the default search provi-
der on iPhone.86 A new entrant would be unable to make an up-front payment
even a fraction of that size, plus Google’s contract with Apple has an extended dur-
ation, preventing competitors from counterbidding to contest the market.
It is equally unrealistic to suggest that NewCo might build its own mobile eco-
system to avoid the restrictions Google imposes. If NewCo encouraged mobile
device manufacturers to preinstall its search engine on “bare” Android devices,
the resulting devices would forego the benefits contingent on a MADA. Such
devices would thus forego all Google apps – effectively requiring that NewCo
offer not just a better search engine but a full suite of apps including maps,
mail, photos, a video library and more. Such devices would also forego Google
Play delivery of apps from third parties – thus requiring that NewCo somehow
devises a method of providing third-party apps, either via a new app store or
via sideloading as described in Section I.B.3. Google’s restrictions thus raise the
bar required for a more efficient competitor. With these restrictions in place, it
is not enough for NewCo to be better at search, as NewCo must also build or
replace the entire set of services Google offers.
The above hypothetical example illustrates how Google’s contract provisions
interlock to impede entry even by competitors with high-quality offerings. An
86Joel Rosenblatt and Adam Satariano, ‘Google Paid Apple $1 Billion to Keep Search Bar
on iPhone’ Bloomberg (21 January 2016) <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-
01-22/google-paid-apple-1-billion-to-keep-search-bar-on-iphone>.































occasional competitor might somehow find a way through, but Google’s restric-
tions block the most natural approaches and raise the entrant’s costs and
challenges.
III. Legal assessment
We begin with two important observations. First, as noted above, our legal assess-
ment of Google’s Android-related practices is constrained by the lack of publicly
available information on some of the contractual requirements Google imposes on
device manufacturers that want to manufacture commercially viable devices. The
AFA is one notable example of a contract that to this day is unavailable to the
public. In addition, we have only limited information about the financial incentives
that Google allegedly pays to device manufacturers and mobile network operators
on the condition that Google Search is preloaded as the exclusive search provider
on their devices. As a result, our antitrust assessment of Google’s practices will
largely focus on the MADA-related restrictions, for which contracts became avail-
able to the public as discussed in footnote 28. We also provide a brief, albeit
necessarily incomplete, assessment of the AFA and the financial incentives.
Second, we have also seen that Google’s Android-related practices are inves-
tigated in various jurisdictions whose antitrust laws vary to some extent. We pri-
marily assess these practices under EU competition law because European
authorities seem to be taking the closest look at Google’s practices in this area.
However, we take a conservative approach by, for instance, applying a more
demanding test to Google’s tying conduct than the one required by the EU
case-law. In this section, we identify three exclusionary practices: (i) Google’s
MADA requirements that device manufacturers include certain Google apps
and defaults in order to get any part of GMS; (ii) Google’s AFA prohibition
that device manufacturers sell devices running on competing operating systems
based on Android and (iii) Google’s financial incentives to device manufacturers
and carriers for exclusive preinstallation of Google Search. The first and third
directly protect Google’s dominance Search, while the first also benefits other
Google’s position in the market for certain other apps and services. The second
raises the stakes for device manufacturers and increases the effectiveness of the
other methods. We review these practices in turn.
A. MADA requirements that device manufacturers include certain Google
apps and defaults in order to get any part of Google mobile services
As discussed in Section II.A, Google’s MADA strategy leverages the company’s
market power in certain services and apps for which there is no clear substitute
(most notably Google Play and YouTube) in order to compel device manufacturers
wishing to manufacture commercially viable devices to install other services and
apps (including Google Search and Google Maps) for which there are substitutes.
This is a clear case of tying.































In this section, we describe the notion of tying, as well as its possible pro- and
anti-competitive effects. We then review the legal test applied to tying under EU
competition law, and we apply that test to Google’s tying practices.
1. Tying and its effects87
Tying generally refers to a situation where a seller refuses to sell one product (the
“tying” product) unless the buyer also takes another product (the “tied” product).88
Sellers can implement tying on a contractual basis, with a tie enforced through
contractual provisions to that effect. Sellers can also use a technical or technologi-
cal tie where, for instance, the tying and the tied product are physically integrated
or designed in such a way that they can only work together.
Tying is commonly used by firms with or without market power to offer better,
cheaper and more convenient products and services. Shoes have always been sold
with laces and cars with tyres. But product integration extends beyond these
simple products and has become a key business strategy in many industries. For
instance, manufacturers of consumer electronics combine many components
into a single product that works better or is more cost effective, smaller or
energy-efficient. Smartphones comprise elements that used to be provided separ-
ately (phone, camera and more), and the smartphone’s screen and software provide
a flexible platform that allows integration of ever more functions.
While tying is usually pro-competitive, it may also be used as an exclusionary
strategy. First, a firm that is dominant in the market for the tying product may seek
to extend its market power into the market for the tied product. Since consumers
must obtain the tying product from the dominant firm, the firm can expand its
dominance by tying the purchase of the two goods together.89 If the firm ties a
complementary product to its monopoly product, customers can only buy the mon-
opoly product if they also purchase the tied product. Second, there may be circum-
stances where tying protects dominance in the tying product market.90 Consider a
87Our articulation of the relevant legal standard and proposed text is based in part on a
working paper draft ultimately published, in part, as Benjamin Edelman, Does Google
Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling? 11 Journal of Competition Law
& Economics 365 (2015). The relevant sections were largely removed from the published
text due to space constraints.
88In Eastman Kodak, the Court defined tying as “an agreement by a party to sell one product
but only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a different (or tied) product, or at least
agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.” Eastman Kodak
v. Image Technical Servs, 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992). See also Guidance on the Commis-
sion’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusion-
ary conduct by dominant undertakings issued in December 2008, OJ 2009, C45/7, at § 48.
89See Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Global Antitrust Law and Economics (2nd edn
2011), at p. 562 et seq.
90See eg R Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging Strategy in Antitrust, 87 Georgetown
Law Journal 2079 (1999).































tying monopolist that expects successful tied product-makers to evolve into tying
product-makers. Such a monopolist has an incentive to foreclose rivals in the tied
product markets to prevent or reduce competition in its tying market.
We offer several additional observations as to the effects of tying in online
markets. First, anti-competitive harm may occur even if users are not asked to
pay directly for the tying product or the tied product. A provider of free online ser-
vices may have an incentive to extend its dominance in the provision of some ser-
vices (the tying services) to other services (the tied services) in order to improve its
capacity to monetize the services it provides on the paying side of the platform
(e.g., advertising).91 This strategy is particularly prominent among multi-sided
platforms: A platform operator may provide service to one set of users without
a direct charge, choosing instead to profit from fees charged to others. For
example, in the context we consider, Google may find that it can increase its adver-
tising revenue by controlling a greater share of online services (search, maps,
travel services, etc.).
Second, while competition law does not require a showing of dominance in the
tied product market, it makes no difference if the firm engaged in the tie is also
dominant in that market. For instance, if Firm A manufactures dominant
product X (for which there is no substitute) and Y (which is highly successful,
but for which there are substitutes), A might protect Y by tying it to X. Thus, a
firm’s dominance in the tied product market does not mean that it cannot
benefit from a tie, as the tie may be used to protect it from challenges from com-
peting products. That is the case here, since Google can use the apps and services
for which there are no substitutes to protect and increase its dominant position in
search and other key apps to which there are substitutes.
Third, additional measures may magnify the effects of tying. One might not
ordinarily think of favoured formatting, preferred placement or default settings
as “products” that could be tied. But a dominant firm that controls an enabling
infrastructure (such as a search engine result page or an operating system) is
well positioned to grant preferential access to these benefits, specifically reserving
special benefits only for its own services. Given the known importance of format-
ting and placement in shaping users’ actions and the known importance of defaults
in influencing users’ choices,92 these benefits are likely to significantly sway
market outcomes.
2. The EU case-law on tying
The European Commission has issued a number of decisions concerning tying,
most famously its 2004 finding that Microsoft abused its dominant position on
91Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1
Journal of the European Economic Association 990 (2003).
92n 62.































the PC operating system market. In Microsoft, the Commission decided that
Microsoft infringed Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) by tying Windows with Windows Media Player (WMP).93 The
Commission found that anti-competitive tying requires the presence of the follow-
ing elements: (i) The tying and the tied goods are two separate products; (ii) The
undertaking concerned is dominant in the tying product market; (iii) The undertak-
ing concerned does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product without
the tied product and (iv) The tying in question forecloses competition.94
The Commission found that WMP and Windows were two separate pro-
ducts.95 The distinctness of products had to be assessed with an eye towards con-
sumer demand. The Commission noted that the market provided media players
separately, which the Commission considered evidence of separate consumer
demand for media players versus client PC operating systems. It also found that
Microsoft was dominant in the market for PC operating systems and established
that customers were not given the choice of acquiring the tying product without
the tied product. As to the element of foreclosure, the Commission first stated
that tying has a harmful effect on competition,96 but also acknowledged that
there were circumstances “which warrant a closer examination of the effects
that tying has on competition in this case.”97 The Commission thus decided to
use an effects-based approach and found that Microsoft’s conduct created anti-
competitive effects, hence condemning Microsoft’s tie of WMP.
Microsoft subsequently appealed the decision of the Commission to the
General Court of the EU (GC).98 In its judgment, the GC supported the position
of the Commission that (i) operating systems for PCs and media players are dis-
tinct products; (ii) Microsoft is dominant on the market for operating systems
and (iii) the condition of coercion is met in that Microsoft did not give consumers
the option of obtaining Windows without WMP. However, the GC departed from
the Commission’s effects-based approach to evaluating foreclosure. It noted the
Commission’s finding that the ubiquitous presence of WMP on PCs provided a
significant “competitive advantage” to Microsoft, and the GC said that this
finding was “sufficient to establish that the fourth constituent element of
abusive bundling is present in this case.”99 For the GC to demonstrate that the
93Commission Decision, 24 March 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft. See Damien
Geradin, Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the EC Treaty: What Can the EU Learn from
the US Supreme Court’s Judgment in Trinko in the Wake of Microsoft, IMS, and Deutsche
Telekom, 41 Common Market Law Review 1519 (2004).
94ibid at § 794.
95ibid, section 5.3.2.1.2.
96ibid at § 835.
97ibid at § 841.
98Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, [2007] ECR 2007 II-3601. See generally, Christian
Ahlborn and David S Evans, ‘The Microsoft Judgement and Its Implications for Compe-
tition Policy Towards Dominant Firms in Europe’, 75 Antitrust Law Journal 887 (2009).
99ibid at § 1058.































tying in question creates a competitive advantage that rivals are unable to replicate,
it was thus sufficient to show that WMP was ubiquitous. After demonstrating such
a competitive advantage, it is no longer necessary to show that the tying produces
foreclosure effects in the market in question.
Although the European Commission can probably satisfy itself in applying the
test developed by the GC in Microsoft to establish a breach of Article 102 TFEU,
we think that it is generally desirable that antitrust authorities apply a stricter test
requiring them to establish that the tying practice under investigation produces
foreclosure effects and consumer harm. Furthermore, we suggest that the assess-
ment should consider any efficiencies that may be generated by the challenged
practice. With these extensions, in the next section we develop a six-step test,
which we subsequently apply to Google’s tying.
3. Proposed modified test
Because tying can be a source of efficiencies, we believe that such practices should
be analysed with consideration of the following six questions: (i) Does the defen-
dant have market power in the tying product; (ii) Are the tying and the tied product
different?; (iii) Are the tying product and the tied product tied together?; (iv) Does
the tie foreclose competitors?; (v) Does the tie create consumer harm? and (vi) Are
there countervailing efficiencies?
To establish the presence of illegal tying, we suggest that foreclosure effects
and consumer harm must be demonstrated, not merely presumed. We then
balance such harms against any efficiencies generated by the tie in order to deter-
mine the net effect of the tie.
4. Application of the test to Google’s MADA restrictions
We now apply our six-part test to Google’s MADA restrictions.
a. Market power in the tying product. Google uses as tying products certain ser-
vices and apps for which there are no clear substitutes, such as Google Play and
YouTube. The Commission has not yet defined a market for “app stores,” but
such a market can be defined based on requirements and functionality. Notably,
Google is dominant in this market not only because it has several times more
apps than any competing Android app stores,100 but more fundamentally
because Google makes its popular apps available only through Google Play.
Thus, for mainstream Android users, there is no real alternative to Google Play.
It is also impossible for device manufacturers to preload a must-have Google
app without also taking the other apps specified by Google in the MADA. Any
such must-have app also serves as a tying product. This is the case for
100Statista (n 26).































YouTube, for which there is no real alternative because YouTube hosts a distinc-
tive quantity and selection of video content. Indeed, ComScore reports that
YouTube is the only video app among the top 15 apps.101 YouTube would be
found dominant on any reasonable definition of the mobile video service market.
Of course tying products can change over time. For example, if competition
effectively disappears in a given area (perhaps due to Google’s tie or other
market forces), Google’s offering in that sector may come to lack any competitor,
and Google can then use that offering as a tying product. Perhaps Google’s maps
offerings, Google Maps and Waze, are or might soon be must-have apps that simi-
larly lack competition and thus can serve as tying products. Indeed, within Google
Play’s Navigation section, those two apps each have more than five times as many
reviews as the nearest competitor. (Mapquest, once a household name, has less
than 1% as many Google Play reviews as Google Maps, by all indications indicat-
ing correspondingly light usage of its Android app.102) While some US users turn
to Bing or Yahoo, South Koreans to Naver and Russians to Yandex, there is no
clearly viable general-purpose search engine in most other countries, creating
the possibility that even search could become a tying product.
b. A tie. The MADA contracts specifically prohibits device manufacturers from
preloading Google Play, YouTube or any other must-have apps without also pre-
loading Google Search, Google Chrome and the other apps Google specified in the
MADA. The essence of Google’s tying strategy is that as long as a device manu-
facturer finds even a single Google app essential to the commercial success of its
devices, it must preload all other Google apps.
c. The tying and the tied product(s) are separate. It is hard to deny that Google
Play and apps such as Google Search or Chrome are distinct products. The apps
offer distinct functionalities accessed via distinct on-screen icons. The apps are
embodied in software code distributed in distinct “APK” (Android Package Kit)
file bundles, and each app uses a different APK which can be and is updated sep-
arately from the others. Furthermore, users can manually deactivate some Google
apps and the others will continue to function. The apps are separately tracked by
the Android operating system for purposes of memory consumption, network
transmissions, battery usage and more. Even Google’s contract-writers recognize
the separation between the apps, periodically revising the MADA to adjust which
apps must be included.103
101‘Top 15 Smartphone Apps – Total U.S. Smartphone Mobile Media Users, Age 18 + (iOS
and Android Platforms) – July 2016’ Comscore, <http://www.comscore.com/Insights/
Market-Rankings>, data as of 25 August 2016.
102Authors’ calculations from Google Play, 28 September 2016.
103Efrati (n 31).































Moreover, using the test contained in the EU tying case-law, there is clearly
separate demand for Google Play versus, say, Google Search. A user of an
Android phone may, for instance, be interested in using Google Play to download
a broad selection of third-party apps, but prefer to use another company’s search
service, perhaps to obtain greater privacy protections than Google Search offers.
d. Foreclosing competition. Google’s tie produces exclusionary effects by hin-
dering rival app makers’ efforts to compete with Google Search and other key
apps, which device manufacturers are bound to preload on their devices in
order to provide Google Play and other Google must-have apps. As a result of
the tie, additional apps such as Google Search, Chrome and Maps are ubiquitous
on Android devices from leading manufacturers despite the availability of poten-
tial competitors. Moreover, the tie makes it impossible for rival app makers to pay
device manufacturer to exclusively install their apps on Android devices in order
to reach users en masse. Whatever amount a rival app maker might be willing to
pay for exclusive placement, such as a placement simply is not available.
Moreover, the foreclosure effects of the tie are magnified by Google’s
additional requirements. Google requires that its preinstalled apps be prominent,
with some “at least on the panel immediately adjacent to the Default Home
Screen” and others “no more than one level below the Phone Top.”104 These
requirements reduce a device manufacturer’s ability to feature competitors by rele-
gating Google apps to inferior placement. New contracts also specify the sequence
in which Google apps must be presented,105 further limiting a device manufac-
turer’s flexibility to promote competitors.
Google’s tactics also foreclose competition for components outside the con-
fines of apps. Google requires that devices use its Network Location Provider
service,106 its WebView Component (the core of a web browser),107 and its
voice search and hardware-button-activated search.108 By requiring that all
these settings feature Google, in each instance exclusively because the specified
setting can accommodate only one option at a time, Google prevents competitors
from gaining market position via these settings and the corresponding availability
to users.
An additional foreclosure mechanism arises from the leverage theory offered
in a recent paper by Choi and Jeon.109 They consider a firm in a competitive






109Jay Pil Choi and Doh-Shin Jeon, ‘A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets’,
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11484 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2834821>.































optimal to set a negative price to one side in order to attract more users on the other
side. For example, a search engine operator might pay consumers in order to
attract more advertisers, yielding additional advertising fees more than sufficient
to cover the payments to users. While such payments are attractive in principle,
they suffer numerous practical problems such as fraud, and thus we often
instead observe a zero payment to users in such circumstances. A competitor
seeking to enter market A is thus unable to set a lower price to consumers, and
as a result all firms in this market earn excess profits that are not competed
away through payments to consumers. Against that backdrop, the authors point
out the possibility of the firm tying its offering in market A to its monopolistic
offering in some other market B. A user who wants the firm’s B product is then
required to accept the A product. If the monopolist’s offering in B is sufficiently
compelling, many users may choose it, thereby accepting the monopolist’s offer-
ing in A and increasing the monopolist’s market share in A – letting the monopo-
list expand while satisfying the non-negativity constraint on payments to
consumers. Notably, the monopolist’s effort in no way requires that its offering
in market A be preferable to competitors’ offerings. Taking A to be the market
for mobile apps and mobile search, and B to be the market for app stores and
mobile operating systems, this theory arguably applies to Google’s conduct in
mobile. Choi and Jeon thus offer a robust theoretical understanding of Google’s
conduct and the resulting harm to consumers.
e. Consumer harm. By foreclosing rival app makers, Google harms consumers.
First, mobile device users would benefit from greater competition between
Google’s tied apps (Search, Chrome, etc.) and other apps. As explored in
Section II.D, a new mobile search engine would struggle to attract users on
Android devices in light of the preload and prominence required for Google
Search. The same is true for every app competing with a Google offering that
has guaranteed distribution and prominence per the MADA. Moreover, the list
of apps benefiting from the MADA changes from time to time, as Google sees
fit.110 As a result, even if Google lacks an offering in a new category or has not
historically favoured its app via a MADA provision, Google can easily do so in
the future. Although many of the apps at issue are free, in up-front purchase
price, they nonetheless impose costs on users including in advertising as well as
collection and processing of private information. In all these regards, Android
device users would benefit from competition to increase product diversity and
innovation.
The benefits of competition would be particularly pronounced for the types of
users that pay for Google’s services, most notably advertisers. When Google
knows that it controls most of the advertising venues for reaching users on a
mobile device, it can raise prices with relative confidence – ultimately raising
110Efrati (n 31).































prices in light of advertisers’ willingness to pay. In contrast, if other vendors also
reached users on mobile devices, prices would fall correspondingly – potentially to
prices closer to services’ marginal cost, which would probably be quite low.
Witness the intense competition among the many online publishers that sell
banner advertising, for which prices have dropped sharply,111 versus high prices
for search ads,112 where Google is the only commercially significant seller in
most markets. Competition in mobile apps portends a world of low advertising
prices, benefiting the advertisers whose payments put the system in motion;
whereas lack of competition will bring needlessly high prices that deny advertisers
a significant share of the efficiencies of electronic marketing. When Google drives
up the price of advertising, advertisers pass a portion of that cost on to consumers
(according to the relative elasticity of supply and demand.113
Additional harm results from Google’s efforts to block or sharply limit app
makers from paying for distribution by device manufacturers and network oper-
ators. With such payments, device manufacturers and network operators would
receive a secondary revenue stream to complement consumers’ cash payments.
In competitive markets, device manufacturers and network operators would
compete away these additional revenues by lowering the device purchase prices
they charge to consumers. But when Google prevents device manufacturers and
network operators from offering certain valuable placements (e.g. exclusive prein-
stallation) and limits other placements, Google prevents such payments, leaving
consumers with higher device purchase prices.
f. Efficiencies. In its Guidance Paper on Article 102 TFEU,114 the Commission
observes that in
the enforcement of Article [102], the Commission will also examine claims put
forward by a dominant undertaking that its conduct is justified. A dominant under-
taking may do so either by demonstrating that its conduct is objectively necessary
or by demonstrating that its conduct produces substantial efficiencies which out-
weigh any anti-competitive effects on consumers. In this context, the Commission
will assess whether the conduct in question is indispensable and proportionate to
the goal allegedly pursued by the dominant undertaking.115
111Farhad Manjoo, ‘Fall of the Banner Ad: The Monster That Swallowed the Web’ The
New York Times (5 November 2014) <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/technology/
personaltech/banner-ads-the-monsters-that-swallowed-the-web.html>.
112Mark Ballard, ‘AdWords Brand CPCs Rising? Here’s Why and What You Can Do about
It’ Search Engine Land (23 July 2015) <http://searchengineland.com/adwords-brand-cpcs-
rising-heres-can-225648>.
113Michal Fabinger and Glen Weyl, ‘Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principle of Inci-
dence under Imperfect Competition’ 121(3) Journal of Political Economy 528 (2013).
114Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by domi-
nant undertakings, O.J. 2009, C 45/7.
115ibid at § 28.































Both directly and via various commissioned articles, Google has offered expla-
nations and justifications for its MADA restrictions. In our view, these arguments
are unpersuasive (see Section II.A.3) and do not meet the test set by the Commis-
sion. In fact, Google does not so much seek to justify its practices on the grounds
that they are a source of efficiencies, but rather by denying their restrictive effects,
emphasizing the great degree of “freedom” that Google’s Android policy gives to
device manufacturers. While it is strictly true that a manufacturer does not have to
sign the MADA to develop a bare Android device, they have no choice but to sign
this agreement – and thus accept its restrictions – if they wish to manufacture a
commercially viable device. Moreover, Section II.D explains how these restric-
tions – combined with the restrictions contained in the AFA and the financial
incentives granted to some manufacturers and MNOs – would make it quite diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for an equally or more efficient new search engine to
compete with Google Search. Even if these restrictions were a source of efficien-
cies, they would not justify complete rival foreclosure.
We are therefore sceptical about Google’s claim that its “partner agreements
have helped foster a remarkable – and, importantly, sustainable – ecosystem,
based on open-source software and open innovation.”116 While Android is a suc-
cessful ecosystem, at least in terms of market penetration, the restrictions Google
imposes on device manufacturers make Android much less opened than claimed.
Whatever the goal the restrictions seek to achieve, they create disproportionate
harm competition and innovation.
B. AFA prohibition that device manufacturers sell devices running on
competing operating systems based on Android
Device manufacturers hoping to manufacture commercially viable Android
devices must not only sign the MADA, which guarantees ubiquitous distribution
to Google apps, but also the AFA, which prevents them from making or distribut-
ing modified versions of Android. While our assessment is necessarily limited
without access to the exact contractual provisions, the AFA appears to be
another effort by Google to leverage its market power in certain services to
prevent the creation of alternative platforms that would weaken its control.
Based on what is publicly known about the AFA, it seems to create two forms
of exclusionary effects. First, the AFA prevents leading device manufacturers from
developing an alternative Android-based platform. The development of a single
device using such a platform, perhaps as an experiment to assess market reaction,
would deprive a manufacturer of access to Google Play and must-have Google
apps for all its devices. This form of defensive leveraging reduces platform diver-
sity and is particularly harmful in light of the paucity of competing mobile OS
platforms.
116See Walker (n 9).































Second, the AFA deprives rival app makers of access to alternative Android
platforms to commercialize their apps. If large device manufacturers could offer
devices based on a modified Android platform that did not include GMS, while
maintaining access to GMS for their other devices, then rival app makers could
seek preferred distribution on the modified devices. By assuring that such
devices do not come to market, from the large manufacturers best positioned to
provide low-cost high-quality devices, Google rules out that strategy and further
reduces opportunities for rival app makers.
The AFA’s harm to consumers thus flows not only from foreclosed competition
in apps, but also from the reduced opportunity for device manufacturers to develop
or distribute an alternative Android-based platform.117 While any device manufac-
turer could in theory develop such platforms, the reality is that only companies
with no prior history in developing mobile devices (e.g., Amazon) or Android
devices (e.g., Nokia) are willing to accept the trade-offs Google imposes when
a manufacturer modifies Android. Large manufacturers of Android devices are
better positioned to develop and commercialize alternative Android platforms
based on the skills and capabilities they have developed with Google’s version
of Android, but they cannot accept the penalties Google imposes for experimen-
tation. As a result, end users are left with a choice between Google’s version of
Android on mainstream devices, modified Android on a few unusual devices
from inexperienced manufacturers and the iOS platforms. With iOS too costly
for many users, and devices from lesser-known manufacturers predictably unat-
tractive, many end users are left with no practical choice except Google’s Android.
Whatever the efficiencies resulting from the AFA, we doubt that the need to
protect Android from fragmentation justifies the all-or-nothing bet-the-company
choice Google imposes on device manufacturers. Moreover, experience from
Amazon, Nokia and lesser-known manufacturers suggests that most modifications
of Android are at the level of the user interface, leaving the operating system’s core
intact and making it likely that apps will continue to work as expected. In this
context, the risk of fragmentation could be addressed by strict compatibility
requirements and testing rather than by a quasi-prohibition against modifications.
C. Financial incentives to device manufacturers and carriers for exclusive
preinstallation of Google search
As discussed in Section II.C, Google has neither admitted nor attempted to justify
its apparent practice of paying financial incentives to device manufacturers and
mobile network operators for the exclusive preloading of Google Search on
117In this respect, you could argue that there is an element of “exploitation” in Google’s
approach in that it forces device manufacturers that want to develop commercially viable
Android devices to “unfair trading conditions.” Case C-333/94, Tetra Pak International
SA v. Commission, [1996] E.C.R. I-5951.































their devices. Assuming that the European Commission is correct in claiming that
Google pays incentives for exclusive preloading, this contradicts Google’s claim
that device manufacturers may “choose to load the suite of Google apps to their
device and freely add other apps as well” (emphasis added).118 The reality is man-
ufacturers subject to these incentives would not be “free” to load mobile search
competing with Google Search; such additions would require forfeiting the incen-
tive, a monetary penalty that is the opposite of “free.”
As discussed in Section II.C, we are puzzled by Google offering incentives for
exclusive preloading because the MADA already ensures that Google search will
be preloaded and default. The clearest direct benefit to Google, above and beyond
what the MADA already assures, is the elimination of non-default installation of
competitors, e.g. a Bing or Yahoo app leading to those vendors’ search tools, in
parallel to a default and more prominent Google offering. At the same time, exclu-
sivity payments also offer benefit to Google by hindering growth of prospective
entrants. For example, exclusivity to Google prevents device manufacturers
from learning about consumer response to alternative search engines. When
device manufacturers are committed to Google exclusively, Google hinders
alternative search engines in their efforts to gain traction, ruling out the possibility
of an alternative search engine paying to preinstall its service on thousands of new
phones and thereby gaining the market position and scale necessary to attract
advertisers and build a reputation with consumers.
It is difficult to analyse conduct about which so little known, but payments for
exclusive preloading of Google Search appear to be similar to practices previously
condemned under European competition law. Consider the payments that Intel
allegedly awarded PC manufacturers on the condition that they postpone, cancel
or otherwise restrict the launch of specific AMD-based products – a practice con-
demned under Article 102 TFEU.119 Google might argue that interested Android
end users retain the ability to acquire a competitor’s offering by installing an
alternative search app on their devices. But users seem to do so infrequently.
Nor would the potential user response, offsetting a portion of the harmful effect,
justify payments whose purpose appears calculated to stop rivals. In our view,
there is little doubt that such exclusionary payments would infringe Article 102
TFEU.
IV. Remedies
If Google’s practices are found impermissible under competition law, a crucial
further question will be what changes must be made in response.
A natural starting point is to end Google’s contractual ties, allowing device
manufacturers to install Google apps in whatever configurations they find
118Walker (n 9).
119Commission Decision, 13 May 2009, COMP/C-3 /37.990 – Intel.































convenient and in whatever way they believe the market will value. One might
expect to see low-cost devices that feature Yahoo Search, MapQuest maps and
other apps that vendors are willing to pay to distribute. Other developers will
retain a “pure Google” experience, foregoing such payments from competing
app makers but offering apps from a single vendor, which some users may prefer.
To assure that contractual ties are truly unlocked, Google would need to be
barred from implementing pretextual restrictions or other practices that have the
same effect as the contractual ties. For example, Google ought not limit the func-
tionality of Google Play when accessed from devices with competing apps, nor
should Google withhold the latest versions of the operating system or apps
from device manufacturers who begin to distribute competitors’ apps.
Google might counter that with no compulsion to use Google apps, the OS will
not be profitable.120 But this reasoning is in tension with Google’s prior proclama-
tions that the company will make more money when users increase their online
activity.121 In any event, if Google wants to charge a fee for Android, or for
some of its apps, it would be free to do so. Of course such a fee could not itself
be anti-competitive. For example, it would surely be anti-competitive for
Google to offer Google Play alone for $50 per device, but the full GMS suite
(per the MADA) for free – a hollow choice designed to make only the latter viable.
Remedies should also seek to affirmatively restore competition.122 We see
several possibilities. For one, we note the importance of app stores in distributing
apps and the crucial role Google Play has taken as the sole app store that offers
Google apps. Were Google apps available in other app stores, either because
Google was required to distribute them there or because other app stores were per-
mitted to copy them there, this would help competing app stores gain traction and
demonstrate value to users. For example, if Amazon were permitted to copy
Google apps into its app store, Amazon Fire devices would instantly become sig-
nificantly more attractive to many users, ending a key weakness criticized in many
reviews. Google might object to this remedy as intrusive, but it would require
nothing more than copying small APK files or authorizing app stores to make
such copies themselves. Moreover, this remedy is directly linked to Google’s
120See Walker (n 9).
121Erick Schoenfeld, ‘Breaking: Google Announces Android and Open Handset Alliance’
TechCrunch (5 November 2007) <https://techcrunch.com/2007/11/05/breaking-google-
announces-android-and-open-handset-alliance/>.
122We do not discuss here the possibility of financial penalties on Google, but they could
come in two fashions. First, competition authorities can impose fines, and it is likely that
if the European Commission were to adopt an infringement decision against Google’s
Android-related practices, this decision would be combined with a fine, potentially a
large one. Moreover, decisions of competition authorities would likely be followed by
damages actions, and some plaintiff law firms are already getting ready to pursue such
actions. See Gaspard Sebag, ‘Google Faces New Menace in EU as Hausfeld Eyes
Damages Lawsuits’ Bloomberg (1 September 2015) <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-09-01/google-faces-new-menace-in-eu-as-hausfeld-eyes-damages-lawsuits>.































practice of using Google Play and Google apps in a tying scheme that foreclosed
the development of other app stores.
In light of the impediments Google put in the way of competing app develo-
pers, a full remedy would also attempt to restore competition for key apps. Here,
the European experience withWindows is squarely on point. From 2010 to 2014, a
newWindows computer in Europe was required to show a screen offering a choice
of five web browsers, in random order, with no default such that each user made an
affirmative choice.123 The same approach could be used for Android. “Ballot box”
decisions would most naturally be requested for all the categories of apps that
benefited from tying under Google’s MADA. Alternatively, the ballot box could
be restricted to the categories that are most commercially significant, i.e. those
with frequent usage and those that show advertising. A ballot box could also be
presented when a user first activates a given category of app, i.e. when a user
first requests a map or first requests a local review, in order to get “just-in-time”
contextualized decisions and reduce the up-front decisions requested of users.
V. Looking ahead
Competition lawyers and scholars often claim that regulatory interventions in
high-tech markets create more harm than good. Rather, they suggest, what
matters most is Schumpeterian competition in which new firms displace old
ones.124 Whether or not one shares these views as a general matter, Google’s prac-
tices have the striking effect of impeding entrants. The incumbent phone makers
best-positioned to create innovative devices – efficient at hardware manufacturing,
competing vigorously with each other for device market share – cannot stray from
Google’s requirements lest they lose the right to distribute GMS on their existing
devices. New firms, like Amazon, bring important new resources yet are doubly
hamstrung both by inexperience in the device market and by the incompatibilities
and limitations Google intentionally imposes. The best-funded entrants, such as
Microsoft with Windows Mobile, similarly struggle without access to any
portion of Google’s ecosystem and the apps and services that consumers expect.
Nor is it reasonable to expect a successful challenge to Google’s behemoth
from a niche player (like Cyanogen) or a declining firm (such as Nokia). For
those who favour Schumpeterian competition, in this instance it is not at all
clear where the entrant might come from.
123Dave Heiner, ‘The Browser Choice Screen for Europe: What to Expect, When to Expect
It’ Microsoft TechNet (19 February 2010) <https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/microsoft_
on_the_issues/2010/02/19/the-browser-choice-screen-for-europe-what-to-expect-when-to-
expect-it/>.
124See eg Geoffrey AManne and Joshua DWright, ‘Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The
Case Against the Antitrust Case Against Google’, 34 Harvard Journal of Law and Public
Policy 171 (2011); J Gregory Sidak and David J Teece, ‘Dynamic Competition in Antitrust
Law’, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 581 (2009).































In the realm of search, Google has been widely alleged to favour its own ser-
vices – a strategy which struck some as improper125 but seemed to others the
natural privilege of dominance in search.126 In mobile operating systems,
Google’s contractual approach arguably reduces the disagreement somewhat.
Whereas Google’s tactics in search use elements of technological tying, with
the key practices embodied within Google code, Google’s tactics in mobile
draw more heavily on contracts whose black-letter provisions seem particularly
out of line when subjected to scrutiny. It is in part for this reason that we think
competition authorities are particularly likely to question Google’s contractual
restrictions.
Disclosure statement




125See eg Edelman (n 87).
126Robert H Bork and Gregory Sidak,What Does the Chicago School Teach about Internet
Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google?, 8 Journal of the Competition Law and
Economics 663 (2012).
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